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REAL ESTATE MULTIPLE LISTING SERVICE AS
RESTRAINT OF TRADE
Local real estate boards often operate multiple listing services.' By
this means the real estate listings of each participating broker are made
available to every other participating broker.2 Participation in the
multiple listing service is ordinarily limited to members of the board.
Therefore, exclusion from board membership prevents a broker from
dealing in multiple-listed properties.
The legality of excluding competing real estate brokers from partic-
ipation in a multiple listing service was questioned for the first time
in Grillo v. Board of Realtors.3 The Board's bylaws provided that all
licensed brokers located for at least one year within the Board's terri-
tory and engaged primarily in the real estate business were eligible for
membership. An applicant was required to pay a $1,000 initiation fee
and to submit personal information. After an investigation and per-
sonal interview membership was granted only upon majority vote of
the Board members. Although the plaintiff met the basic membership
requirements, his application for Board membership had been rejected
several times. By suit in equity he sought to have the Board's opera-
tion of the multiple listing service enjoined as an unlawful combina-
tion in restraint of trade4 at common law.5 The trial court held the
1In 1958 there were more than 500 real estate boards conducting multiple listing
services in some form or another as a part of their program. Dep't of Bd.
Services, National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., MULTIPLE LIsTiNG HANDBOOK 5 (n.d.).
2Under one method of operation the submission of information is optional with
the participant, but this method has little appeal. Id. at 6.
391 N.J. Super. 202, 219 A.2d 635 (Ch. 1966).
4The court was not asked to compel his admission to membership in the Board.
Cf. Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961);
see generally Editorial Note, 15 RtrrGERs L. REv. 327 (1961); Note, 75 HARV. L.
REv. 1186 (1962).
5The New Jersey antitrust statutes apply solely to corporate acquisitions and
mergers. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-10 (1939). Some states by statute have made com-
binations and monopolies in restraint of trade unlawful and expressly have given
to third parties injured thereby the right to relief. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 16750; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-114 (1948); IND. ANN. STAT. § 23-122 (Repl. Vol.
1964); Mo. REv. STAT. § 416.090 (Cum. Supp. 1965); NEB. REv. STAT. § 59-821
(Reissue Vol. 1952); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (Repl. Vol. 1965); Omo REV. CODE
ANN. § 1331.08 (Baldwin 1964).
It is generally thought the common law prohibition against restraint of trade
made certain agreements unenforceable but provides no basis for affirmative
relief. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 497 (1940); United States
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commitment of Board members to furnish only to fellow members
information about properties for sale to be an unreasonable restraint
of trade. An injunction was issued against continued operation of the
service so as to exclude nonmember brokers.6
In the absence of a monopoly or conspiracy, an individual has an
absolute right to refuse to deal with anyone for any reason.' A seller
may refuse to sell except to those buyers who will deal only in his
products8 or except to a certain class of buyers.9 Similarly, a buyer may
v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 279 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211
(1899). Where the contract or combination is entered into merely for the pur-
pose of promoting self-interest without any specific intent to coerce or injure a
third party, no right to affirmative relief exists. Palmer v. Atlantic Ice & Coal
Corp, 178 Ga. 405, 173 S.E. 424 (1934); Downs v. Bennett, 63 Kan. 653, 66 Pac.
623 (1901); Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., [1892] A.C. 25. However,
where the purpose of the agreement is to coerce third parties or to remove them
from competition, relief is available. Atlanta Ass'n of Fire Ins. Agents v. Mc-
Donald, 181 Ga. 105, 181 S.E. 822 (1935); Carlson v. Carpenter Contractors' Ass'n,
305 Ill. 331, 137 N.E. 222 (1922); Klingel's Pharmacy v. Sharp & Dohme, 104 Md.
218, 64 Ad. 1029 (1906); Walsh v. Association of Master Plumbers, 97 Mo. App.
280, 71 S.W. 455 (1902); Schwartz v. Laundry & Linen Supply Drivers' Union, 339
Pa. 353, 14 A.2d 438 (1940); Brown v. American Freehold Land Mortg. Co., 97
Tex. 599, 80 S.W. 985 (1904); Hawarden v. Youghiogheny & L. Coal Co., 111 Wis.
545, 87 N.W. 472 (1901); Pratt v. British Medical Ass'n, [1919) 1 K.B. 244. But
see Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223, 55 N.W. 1119 (1893); Macauley Bros.
v. Tierney, 19 R.I. 255, 33 Ad. 1 (1895).
In the instant case the New Jersey court held that the specific public interest in
real estate business, evidenced by a scheme of statutory regulation, N.J. STAT.
ANx. §§ 45:15-1 to 45:15A-12 (1963), coupled with harm to the plaintiff as a direct
competitor established his right to seek affirmative relief, even though the purpose
of the combination was not malicious. 219 A.2d at 643. The court relied strongly
on cases involving the activities of quasi-public service institutions. See, e.g.,
Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 NJ. 582, 170 A.2d 791, 799 (1961);
Terwilliger v. Graceland Memorial Park Ass'n, 35 N.J. 259, 173 A.2d 33, 36 (1961).
6Modification of Board rules and regulations to enable nonmember brokers
within Board territory to participate in the service was left open to the Board,
but the court said its injunction required, among other things: (1) making available
multiple listing information to licensed nonmember brokers, and (2) forwarding
listings obtained by participating nonmembers to the Board for distribution to
all participants. 219 A.2d at 650.
7FTC v. Raymond Bros.-Clark Co., 263 U.S. 565 (1924); see Carew v. Ruther-
ford, 106 Mass. 1, 14 (1870); Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223, 55 N.W. 1119,
1121 (1893); Wesley v. Native Lumber Co., 97 Miss. 814, 53 So. 346 (1910). "It is
part of a man's civil rights that he be left at liberty to refuse business relations
with any person whomsoever, whether the refusal rests upon reason, or is the
result of whim, caprice, prejudice, or malice. With his reasons neither the public
nor third persons have any legal concern." 2 CooLEY, TORTS § 224, at 178 (4th
ed. 1932). But see Civil Rights Act § 201(a), 78 Stat. 243 (1964), 42 U.S.C. S 2000a
(1964).
8Leo J. Meyberg Co. v. Eureka Williams Corp., 215 F.2d 100 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 875 (1954); Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200
F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953); Brosios v. Pepsi-Cola
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refuse to buy except on certain conditions.10 However, what is law-
ful when done by an individual in his own interest is not necessarily
lawful when done by a combination of individuals. Concerted action
is suspect, and a lawful refusal by an individual may become un-
lawful when made in concert with others."
Only those agreements which impose an unreasonable restraint on
trade are unlawful at common law. 12 This rule of reason has been held
to have been incorporated into the Sherman Act,13 thus making the
test of legality of restraint of trade the same under federal statute and
common lav' 4 Concerted refusals to deal have had a confusing his-
tory under the Sherman Act.1a Early decisions of the Supreme Court
held some concerted refusals to be reasonable restraints,', but later
opinions indicate that all concerted refusals to deal are per se unlaw-
ful, 17 that is, conclusively presumed to be an unreasonable restraint. 8
Co., 155 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1946); United States v. J.1. Case Co., 101 F. Supp. 856
(D. Minn. 1951).
9Green v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., 132 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1942), cert.
dismissed, 319 U.S. 777 (1943); Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co.,
227 Fed. 46 (2d Cir. 1915).
1OFTC v. Raymond Bros.-Clark Co., 263 U.S. 565 (1924).
'iBedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37, 54
(1927); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S.
600, 614 (1914); Klingel's Pharmacy v. Sharp & Dohme, 104 Md. 218, 64 Ad. 1029,
1032 (1906); Cornellier v. Haverhill Shoe Mfrs.' Ass'n, 221 Mass. 554, 109 N.E.
643, 645 (1915); Wesley v. Native Lumber Co., 97 Miss. 814, 53 So. 346, 347 (1910).
I2Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 55 (1911); Mitchel v. Reynolds,
1 P. XVms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Ch. 1711).
1326 Star. 209 (1890), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 1, 2 (1964). Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); see United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours
& Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
i 4The court in Grillo looked to federal antitrust experience in determining what
was reasonable or unreasonable restraint at common law. For other instances where
federal law has provided more than ordinary persuasive guidance see People ex rel.
Mosk v. National Research Co., 201 Cal. App. 2d 765, 20 Cal. Rptr. 516 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1962); Ronnie's Bar, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., 411 Pa. 459,
192 A.2d 664 (1963).
laSee 1961 Duke LJ. 606, 608-09.
i 6See Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604 (1898); Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
i7See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 625 (1953) (dictum);
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948) (dictum); but see
United States v. Insurance Bd., 188 F. Supp. 949 (N.D. Ohio 1960). In Klor's
the Court held that a complaint alleging a combination of several major suppliers
together with a retailer to refuse to sell products to the retailer's competitor
established a per se unlawful refusal to deal. Although no purpose or motive for
the combination was alleged, the fact that the combination was between a com-
petitor of the boycotted retailer and his suppliers is strong indication that the
purpose was to eliminate the retailer from competition. Therefore, Klor's seems to
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Whatever the status of concerted refusals to deal under the Sherman
Act, the per se doctrine is not a common law development and the
legality of a restraint on trade under common law must be determined
by application of the rule of reason in all cases.
In assessing the reasonableness of concerted refusals to deal, it is im-
portant to distinguish between "refusals designed to coerce or exclude
third parties... and refusals which stem from contractual obligations
or joint ventures which affect third parties only indirectly." 19 Where
an agreement among competitors is aimed directly at coercing third
parties to conform to a certain pattern of conduct or at excluding them
from competition, courts have had little difficulty in finding unreasona-
ble restraints of trade.20 However, refusals to deal affecting third parties
only indirectly but having neither an element of coercion nor a pur-
pose of eliminating competition 2' raise more difficult questions of re-
involve the evil of coercive action against third parties long condemned as an un-
reasonable restraint. See note 20 infra and accompanying text.
ISThe per se doctrine is an "exception" to the rule of reason. Certain busi-
ness practices, by their nature and character, are considered so inimical to com-
petition and without justification that the reasonableness of the restraint does
not need to be considered. The doctrine was first established by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (price
fixing), and later extended in International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S.
392 (1947) (tying agreements). See generally Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust
Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 MicH. L.
REv. 1139, 1148-56 (1952).
19Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L.
REv. 847, 872 (1955).
20United States v. First Nat'l Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S. 44 (1930); Paramount
Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930); Eastern States Retail
Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914); Brown* v. Jacobs
Pharmacy Co., 115 Ga. 429, 41 S.E. 553 (1902); Klngel's Pharmacy v. Sharp &
Dohme, 104 Md. 218, 64 At. 1029 (1906); Ertz v. Produce Exch., 79 Minn. 140,
81 N.W. 737 (1900); Olive v. Van Patten, 7 Tex. Civ. App. 630, 25 S.W. 428
(1894); Hawarden v. Youghiogheny & L. Coal Co., 111 Wis. 545, 87 N.W. 472
(1901). In Eastern States Retail Lwntber Dealers' Ass'n an association of retail
lumber dealers, in a scheme to deter direct sales by wholesalers to members'
customers, circulated among its members a list of wholesalers who were en-
gaged in that practice. The effect of the circulation of the list was to cause
retailers to refuse to buy from the "blacklisted" wholesalers. In holding the
scheme to be an unreasonable restraint on trade, the Court found that it not
only tended to prevent wholesalers from competing with retailers but also
tended to deter nonmember retailers from dealing with offending wholesalers.
Agreements among competitors even though aimed directly at third parties
might be justified, hence not unlawful. See, e.g., United States v. American
Livestock Comm'n, 279 U.S. 435, 437-38 (1929); Butterick Pub. Co. v FTC, 85
F.2d 522, 526-27 (2d Cir. 1936). However, the legitimate area of coercive prac-
tices is apparently very narrow. See Fashion Originators' Guild of America v.
FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
21See Rahl, Per Se Rules and Boycotts Under the Sherman Act: Some Re-
flections on the Klor's Case, 45 VA. L. REv. 1165, 1172 (1959).
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straint. "There are many 'normal and usual agreements in aid of trade
and commerce' . . which involve the acceptance by the parties of
limitations on their freedom individually to deal with others." 22 Such
agreements are nonetheless refusals to deal with third parties and fore-
close a part of the market to them. To the extent that there is fore-
closure there is restraint of trade,23 and the decisive question is whether
the restraint is unreasonable.
A concerted refusal is not an unreasonable restraint merely because
it operates to the prejudice of excluded parties.24 If formal associa-
tion offers benefits to members not otherwise available, nonmembers
are automatically prejudiced to the extent they are denied those
benefits. Therefore, if the absence of prejudice to others were the
only test of legality, no association could be organized that would
protect and promote the interest of its members.2 "The true test of
legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as
may suppress or even destroy competition." 26
It has been held repeatedly that major exchanges with limited
membership could refuse their services to nonmembers Likewise,
an exchange rule limiting freedom of participants to deal with outside
traders was held not an unreasonable restraint on trade.28 Cases at com-
mon law involving refusals to deal which only indirectly affect third
parties are few.2 9 In one instance,30 an insurance agents' association
22Barber, supra note 19, at 876-77.23The words of Mr. Justice Brandeis warn against hasty judgments as to the
legality of this kind of restraint: "Every agreement concerning trade, every
regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence ...
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).24Prairie Farmer Pub. Co. v. Indiana Farmer's Guide Pub. Co., 88 F.2d 979,
983 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 696 (1937); Interborough News Co. v.
Curtis Publishing Co., 127 F. Supp. 286, 301 (SD.N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 225 F.2d 289
(2d Cir. 1955); Booker & Kinnaird v. Louisville Bd. of Fire Underwriters, 188
Ky. 771, 224 S.W. 451, 455 (1920).
25Booker & Kinnaird v. Louisville Bd. of Fire Underwriters, 188 Ky. 771, 224
SAV. 451, 455 (1920).
26Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
27Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926); Hunt v. New York
Cotton Exch., 205 U.S. 322 (1907); Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock
Co., 198 U.S. 236 (1905); Chamber of Commerce v. FTC, 13 F.2d 673 (8th Cir.
1926).2SChicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
29Generally at common law affirmative relief can be obtained only where
the refusal was intended to coerce or injure third parties. See note 5 supra.
30Booker & Kinnaird v. Louisville Bd. of Fire Underwriters, 188 Ky. 771, 224
S.V. 4 5 1 (1920).
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bylaw prohibiting members from dealing with nonmember agents or
with companies not represented by association members was upheld.
Where a refusal to deal is not designed to coerce or exclude but
affects third parties only indirectly, no certain standard of reasonable-
ness can be identified by examining the denial of services. Instead,
the reasonableness of the restraint depends on the basis for denying
membership in the refusing group. Associated Press bylaws granting
each member power to block its nonmember competitor from mem-
bership, placing financial assessments on an existing member's com-
petitor when admitted, and forbidding AP members to sell news to
nonmembers were held unlawful in Associated Press v. United States.
31
By definition the bylaw restricting the sale of news to members was
a concerted refusal to deal. But the Court affirmed the lower court's
ruling that the refusal to deal was unlawful only "when taken in con-
nection with the restrictive membership" 32 bylaws. Judge Learned
Hand, for the three-judge district court, had found that the commit-
ments to sell news only to AP members "taken by themselves, and
apart from the restrictions upon membership . . . would be valid" 3
as essential to the main purpose of the AP. If a group refusal to
deal were unlawful merely because it was a refusal, regardless of the
manner of selecting members, it follows that all individuals seeking to
deal with the group would be entitled to do so. The decree in As-
sociated Press did not direct AP to make its news services available
to all for the asking; it went no further than to strike down com-
petition with an AP member as a basis for denying membership.
34
Thus, in relying on cases dealing with refusals aimed directly at third
parties35 and in referring to the AP organization as "designed to stifle
competition," 36 the Court was analyzing not the refusal to sell news to
nonmembers but the restrictions on membership for competitors of
AP members. In upholding noncoercive refusals as reasonable restraints,
courts have emphasized the absence of unreasonable restrictions on ob-
taining membership,37 hence recognizing requirements for membership
as the critical test of legality of the group's action.
A working standard of reasonableness can be identified by examining
31326 U.S. 1 (1945).
3 2Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 22 (1945).
33United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
34Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 22 (1945).
351d. at 19.
361bid.
37See, e.g., Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604, 614, 619 (1898); Booker &
Kinnaird v. Louisville Bd. of Fire Underwriters, 188 Ky. 771, 224 S.W. 451, 455
(1920).
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membership requirements and selection. Clearly denial of membership
solely because the applicant is a competitor of association members
is an unreasonable restraint of trade;38 the purpose of such exclusion
could only be to stifle or destroy competition. 9 However, member-
ship requirements might well be established for purposes other than
pure economic self-interest. One such purpose common to business
groups is that of advancing and maintaining standards of a trade or
profession.40 The advancement of professional skills and conduct is
in the public interest;41 therefore, denial of membership to one who
would detract from this purpose might be justified.42 In any case,
determination of the reasonableness of the restraint requires a con-
sideration of the value of the group's purpose to the public and the
appropriateness of the particular group as a vehicle for effectuating
that purpose in light of the extent to which trade is affected. Further-
more, the reasonableness of the restraint might depend on circum-
stances surrounding denial of membership. Certainly an association
should not be permitted to exclude applicants "arbitrarily or, where
factual accuracy is relevant, erroneously." -3 Where the consequences
of exclusion are severe to an individual, a right of appeal to the associa-
tion might be required. 44
3SAssociated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); United States v. Charg.
It of Baltimore, Inc., 1960 Trade Cas. 69,870 (D. Md. 1960); United States v.
Florists' Tel. Delivery Ass'n, 1956 Trade Cas. 1 68,367 (E.D. lich. 1956); United
States v. Nationwide Trailer Rental System, Inc., 1955 Trade Cas. 68,101 (D.
Kan. 1955).
39See note 20 supra.
4ODevelopnents in the Law-Judicial Control of Private Associations, 76 HARV.
L. REV. 983, 1046-49 (1963).
41See United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703, 712 (D.C
Cir. 1940).
42See Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n of America, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.
1966); cf. Appalachian Power Co. v. American Institute of Certified Pub. Ac-
countants, 177 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curian, 268 F.2d 844 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 887 (1959).
43Developments in the Law, supra note 40, at 1053. See United States v. New
York Produce Exch., 1959 Trade Cas. t 69,395 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (consent decree
ordering the exchange to issue its "petroleum inspector" licenses on basis of
"uniform, reasonable and nondiscriminatory standards").
44Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963). The exchange ordered
member firms to terminate their private wire connections with a nonmember
over-the-counter dealer. The termination was ordered after an investigation
revealed objectionable elements in the nonmember's background, but no hearing
was held nor were the reasons for termination directly communicated to the
nonmember. Without deciding whether the exchange would have been justified
if proper procedures had been observed, its action was held an unreasonable
restraint on trade. The Court did not deny that the exchange had a legitimate
interest to protect in limiting the availability of its services but concluded that
its procedure in refusing the service was unreasonable.
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